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Rules and Judicial Review

RULES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Emily Sherwin*
University of San Diego
Judicial review of statutes on constitutional grounds is affected by a cluster
of doctrinal practices that are generally accepted, but not very well explained, by the courts and not entirely consistent with each other. Courts
usually judge statutes “as applied” rather than as written;1 they favor “severance” of valid applications of statutes from invalid or possibly invalid applications when possible;2 and they interpret statutes in ways that avoid
constitutional difficulty.3 These overlapping practices presumably are intended to preserve legislation, and hence are associated with a modest
conception of the role of courts in government. Yet they are not always
modest in operation.4
The objective of this article is to examine the effect of statute-saving devices such as as-applied adjudication, severance, and narrowing interpretation, and to consider whether a rule-oriented analysis of judicial review can
offer any insights about how courts should handle unconstitutional statutes.5
I. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES, SEVERABILITY,
AND SAVING INTERPRETATIONS
A. Summary of Current Practice
One frequently stated principle of judicial review is that constitutional
challenges to statutes normally will be treated as challenges to statutes as
*Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Thanks to Larry Alexander and Kevin Clermont
for helpful comments.
1. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235 (1994); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359 (1998).
2. See generally Mark Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41 (1995);
John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993); Robert Stern, Separability and
Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 82–106 (1937).
3. See generally Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997).
4. Several commentators have equated the practices mentioned in the text to judicial
revision of statutes. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 292–93 (severance results in a “judicially rewritten
law”); Nagle, supra note 2, at 220 (the product of severance is “akin to a new statute”); Schauer,
supra note 3, at 80–81 (narrowing construction is a form of “redrafting”).
5. For a comprehensive discussion and defense of the essential connection between constitutional rights and rules, to which I am much indebted, see Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against
Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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applied in particular cases, rather than as challenges to statutes as they
appear on the books. The Supreme Court, for example, has stated that to
succeed in a facial challenge to a statute, a litigant must “establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid.”6 Only if the
statute has no valid, independent applications, or if the case falls within the
special “overbreadth” and “vagueness” doctrines associated with freedom of
expression and perhaps with other liberties, will the court hold the statute
wholly invalid, on its face.7 The usual consequence of as-applied adjudication is that if the court finds the statute valid as applied to the challenger,
the challenger loses and the statute remains in force, even if other applications might be impermissible.8
A second principle of judicial review holds that unconstitutional provisions of statutes normally will be “severed” from other, valid provisions. If
unconstitutional (or constitutionally questionable) provisions are found to
be severable from other, valid provisions, the court will enforce the valid
portion of the statute.9 If the court determines that the statute is not
severable, however, it will address the statute as a whole, and proof that
some provisions are invalid means that the statute is unenforceable in its

6. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Some have read the statement quoted
in the text to mean that a statute cannot be challenged on its face if it has some constitutional
applications. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 250. Marc Isserles interprets it to mean that a statute is
facially invalid if the terms of the statute, “measured against the relevant constitutional doctrine, and independent of the constitutionality of particular applications,” state a constitutionally invalid rule. Isserles, supra note 1, at 387.
7. An example of a statute with no valid applications is one that contains a discriminatory
predicate. For example, a statute that prohibits assaults by blacks is invalid in all applications,
although assaults can be prohibited, including assaults by blacks. See Lawrence A. Alexander,
Is there an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 545 (1985) (giving examples of
statutes that are necessarily invalid in all applications because their predicates are underinclusive). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (hate speech ordinance facially
invalid because it targeted the content of speech); Isserles, supra note 1, at 386–95 (discussing
facial challenges based on a constitutional violation inherent in the terms of the statute).
On First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, see generally Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lawrence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1022–24,
1033–35 (2d ed. 1988); Alexander, supra; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100
YALE L.J. 853, 854 (1991); Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1083 (1997); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
First Amendment Overbreadth is briefly discussed at notes 37–39, infra.
8. See, e.g., Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912)
(railroad that refused to settle a nonfrivolous damage claim could not challenge a railroad
liability statute that might be unconstitutional when applied to frivolous claims).
9. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931–35, 959 (1983); Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480
U.S. 678, 684–97 (1987). John Nagle lists five ways in which a question of severability can arise:
A litigant may claim that a statute is invalid in its entirety because unconstitutional provisions
are not severable from the rest of the statute; a litigant may claim that one provision is
unenforceable because it is not severable from other invalid provisions; a litigant may claim
that one application of a statute is unacceptable because it is not severable from other invalid
applications; a litigant may argue that provisions of a statute are not severable, and therefore
another litigant cannot enforce any part of the statute; or a litigant may challenge a statute as
underinclusive or overinclusive. Nagle, supra note 2, at 208–09.
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entirety.10 Thus, the effect of severance is often much the same as the effect
of as-applied adjudication.11
Despite the similar consequences of severance and as-applied decision
making, a somewhat different set of rules applies to severability. The traditional formula asks (1) whether the remainder of the statute can operate
coherently as an independent statute, and (2) whether the legislature
would have enacted the remainder of the statute alone.12 Although severability has not always been favored, courts now generally presume that
statutes are severable, stating that legislation should be preserved to the
greatest extent possible or that severance is a way to avoid unnecessary
constitutional decisions.13 Statutes often address the question of severability
by providing that in case of challenge their valid provisions should be
preserved, but courts have not treated these severability clauses as decisive.
Inclusion of a severability clause in the statute at best raises or reinforces
the presumption of severability.14
A third principle affecting judicial review of statutes is that courts should
interpret statutes in ways that avoid unconstitutionality, or that avoid constitutional questions.15

10. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81–84
(1976).
11. Michael Dorf has argued that the normal practice of judging the constitutionality of
statutes as-applied is in effect a practice of severance. Dorf, supra note 1, at 249–50. See also
Stern, supra note 2, at 82–87 (discussing separable applications of statutes); Dorf equates
severability and as-applied adjudication.
With severability in mind, First Amendment overbreadth doctrine can be conceived as an
exception to the normal practice of severing constitutional from unconstitutional applications
of statutes, in response to special concerns about the deterrent effect of the statute on
protected expression. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 261–62 (equating a deterrent-based account
of First Amendment overbreath with “a presumption of nonseverability where rights of expression are concerned”).
12. E.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932), overruled in other respects, Philips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950)
(“Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is
left is fully operative as a law.”) ; New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992) (quoting Champlin,
supra); Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Champlin, supra); Dorf, supra
note 1, at 285 (stating that forty-eight of fifty states follow this test); Nagle, supra note 2, at
210–211 (discussing the test).
13. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (“[T]he presumption is in favor of
severability.”); Nagle, supra note 2, at 218–20 (tracing the history of presumptions for and
against severability); cf. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686 (stating that “In the absence of a
severability clause, . . . Congress’ silence is just that—silence,” but also quoting the standard
test, which calls for severance unless it is “evident” that legislature would not have enacted the
valid portion of the statute alone).
14. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686 (severability clause creates a presumption in favor
of severability). On severability clauses, see generally, Movsesian, supra note 2, at 73–77; Nagle,
supra note 2, at 234–46; Stern, supra note 2, at 120–28.
15. See, e.g., De Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Counsel,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”); Ashwander v. Tennessee, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285
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This principle differs from as-applied adjudication or severance in that it
purports to exonerate the statute completely from charges of unconstitutionality. If the court arrives at an interpretation that avoids constitutional
difficulties simply because it believes that this is what the legislature intended, no question of as-applied decision making or severability can arise.
It is likely, however, that a saving interpretation typically entails rejecting the
most plausible interpretation of a statute in favor of a constitutionally safe,
but less plausible, reading.16 Otherwise, the principle that courts should
read statutes in ways that avoid constitutional questions adds nothing to
interpretation. As a result, the effect of a saving construction is similar to
that of a decision to uphold a statute as applied or to sever provisions of the
statute: It alters the original legislation.17 If the interpretation the court
settles on is not the interpretation the legislature intended, but the best
interpretation that can be reconciled with the Constitution, the court has
either severed applications of the statute, or simply rewritten it.18
The common feature of the three practices just described is that in each
case, the effect of the court’s decision is to create a new rule. When a court
finds an unconstitutional application to be severable from other valid applications, what remains after severance is a new, narrower law.19 When a court
U.S. 22, 62 n.8 (1932) (“‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided.’”).
16. Frederick Schauer has made this argument persuasively. Schauer, supra note 3, at 83–84.
It can be argued that legislatures intend statutes to be given a meaning that conforms to
constitutional requirements. Cf. Alexander, supra note 7, at 542–43 (arguing that constitutional
requirements can be read into statutes either as external limits or “[b]y indulging the fiction
that the legislature always intends to incorporate the Constitution into each of its laws).
Schauer points out, however, that our political system does not impose sanctions on legislators
who overreach constitutional boundaries; hence there is no reason to assume, as a matter of
intent, that statutes incorporate constitutional limits. Schauer, supra at 92–93.
17. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 80–81; Stern, supra note 2, at 95.
18. For strong criticism of the practice of avoiding constitutional questions by narrow
construction of statutes, see Schauer, supra note 3, at 91–98.
Adrian Vermeule presents an interesting analysis of the relation between severability and the
rule that courts should construe statutes to conform to constitutional requirements. According
to Vermeule, an early version of this rule stated that, given two possible interpretations, one
constitutional and one unconstitutional, the court should choose the constitutional interpretation. In the version now prevalent, however, the rule states that courts should interpret
statutes to avoid constitutional questions. Thus, the early form of the rule required a constitutional decision (namely, that one reading of the statute was in fact unconstitutional), and
therefore operated much like a severability decision following a finding of unconstitutionality.
In comparison, the current form of saving construction deflects constitutional questions.
Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1948–49. In Vermeule’s view, this early form of saving construction,
as well as the typical form of severance following a finding of unconstitutionality, are more
legislation-friendly practices because a saving construction to avoid constitutional questions
forecloses applications of the statute that might be valid. Id. at 1960.
19. See Adler, supra note 5, at 125–32 (comparing facial invalidation of statutes to various
forms of “optimal revision”); Dorf, supra note 1, at 292–93 (discussing severance); Nagle, supra
note 2, at 220 (same).
If the court defers constitutional decision, by presuming that other, possibly invalid, provisions are severable or by simply holding that the statute is acceptable as applied (and therefore
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interprets a statute in a way it would not endorse in order to avoid constitutional difficulty, the result is a new, narrower law.20
It might be thought that as-applied adjudication involves a different type
of judicial action—that here the court is not altering the rule of the statute
but only recognizing that the particular acts of the challenger are constitutionally privileged.21 To view as-applied adjudication in this way, however,
one must conceive of the Constitution as a body of law directly applicable
to actors, rather than as a set of constraints on law. Other participants in
this symposium have argued convincingly that this conception is neither
textually sound, logically appealing, nor borne out by the practice of the
Supreme Court. Instead, a constitutional right is best conceived of not as a
right to act, but as a right to be governed and judged by valid laws.22 If one
accepts this premise, a decision upholding or invalidating a statute as
applied is not a decision about privilege, but a decision that part of the
statute—a severable subrule applied to the challenger—is valid. Accordingly, the result of the decision is, once again, a new, narrower law.
Thus, all three of the practices I have discussed—as-applied adjudication,
severance, and avoidance of constitutional questions through narrow interpretation of statutes—result in judicial promulgation of new law. In the
interest of preserving legislation, the court is legislating.

B. Methodology
Commentary on severability and as-applied adjudication suggests at least
four methods courts might use to determine when to save statutes by
separating valid from invalid provisions or applications. For this purpose, I

implicitly severable), it does not immediately amend the statute, but it sets the stage for an
amendment. In the case of Supreme Court review of a state statute, it is the state court that
ultimately amends the statute, if it chooses to find the statute severable. See, e.g., Yazoo &
Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912) (upholding statute
as applied and leaving further applications to the state); Dorf, supra at 283–84 (discussing
federal review of state statutes); Monaghan, supra note 2, at 6–8 (discussing Yazoo, severability,
and state courts).
20. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 80–81 (narrowing interpretation is a form of “redrafting”);
Stern, supra note 2, at 82 (“the result can be described as amending the law”).
21. See Adler, supra note 5, at 5–7 (describing a “Direct Account” of constitutional rights, in
which a reviewing court holds the treatment of a particular litigant to be unconstitutional, in
contrast to a “Derivative Account,” in which the court invalidates or revises the rule under
which the litigant was sanctioned); Dorf, supra note 1, at 244–46 (describing but ultimately
rejecting a “privileged-conduct-only” view of constitutional rights); Monaghan, supra note 7, at
4–5 (describing an activity-oriented view of constitutional rights).
22. See Adler, supra note 5, at 91–132 (defending the “Derivative Account” of constitutional
rights); Alexander, supra note 7, at 545 (suggesting that the Constitution limits the reasons for
which government can act, rather than protecting particular acts); Dorf, supra note 1, at
242–50 (arguing that constitutional rights are best conceived as rights to be judged by a valid
rule); Monaghan, supra note 7, at 4–8 (arguing that litigants have a right to be judged by a
constitutionally valid rule).

304

EMILY SHERWIN

shall assume that severability and as-applied adjudication are variants of the
same problem.23
Perhaps the most obvious approach is to try to ascertain what the legislature actually intended—what did it want courts to do in case a part of the
statute failed? As a general matter, the primary source of information about
legislative intent, at least according to current Supreme Court practice, is
statutory text. Beyond the text, courts refer to such standard tools as
structure, purpose, and legislative history.24 Some have suggested that the
same methods should be applied to decide questions of severability.25 One
consequence is that a severability clause normally would be conclusive.26
An intent-based, primarily textual approach to severability and related
questions is based on the sensible premise that severability is a matter of
statutory interpretation—part of the meaning of the statute. At least in
ordinary severability cases outside the sphere of the First Amendment,27
courts have no source for conclusions about severability apart from the
statute itself. The difficulty with an approach based on actual intent is that
severability questions are triggered by unplanned statutory failures. There
may be cases in which a legislature anticipates a specific constitutional
challenge and provides for severability, but a legislature that believes its
statute to be constitutionally sound typically will have no intent on the
question what to do if part of the statute is held invalid. This means both
that severability clauses are included without particular instances of severance in mind,28 and that structure, purpose, and legislative history will have
little to say about actual legislative intent.29 There simply is no actual intent
about the problem before the court.
A second approach is a variant on the intent-based approach that seeks
hypothetical, rather than actual, legislative intent. Based on the other
intentions the legislature appears to have had in connection with the
statute, what would it want a court to do when part of the statute has
23. See supra text following note 23.
24. I do not intend to take a position on the difficult problem of interpretation. See generally,
LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321 (1990). It is enough for my purposes that courts search for evidence of intent in the text,
and secondarily in such sources as structure, purpose, and legislative history. See, e.g., Huffman
v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 672 (1988) (quoting United States v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)) (text); INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)
(“plain language . . . , symmetry . . . , and legislative history”); Nagle, supra note 2, at 232.
25. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 73–82, proposing a textual approach, together with a
“default rule” in favor of severability; Nagle, supra note 2, at 232–34 (proposing that courts treat
severability as a question of intent, relying primarily on text).
26. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 74–75; Nagle, supra note 2, at 234–46 (allowing an
exception for “absurd results”).
27. See note 27, supra, text at notes 37–39, infra.
28. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 2, at 122–23 (commenting on indiscriminate use of separability clauses); but cf. Nagle, supra note 2, at 241 (tracing the history of a 1989 child-care bill, in
which Senators anticipated particular challenges).
29. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 2, at 246–50.
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failed?30 Another way to frame the question is to examine the provisions
that would remain after severance, consult legislative history, and ask
whether the legislature would have enacted the remaining provisions
alone.31 Because legislative intent is admitted to be hypothetical, severability clauses are now evidence of intent, but by no means conclusive.32
This hypothetical intent approach is part of the test for severability now
used by the Supreme Court and most other courts: To find a statute
severable, the court must be satisfied that the remaining parts would have
been enacted by the legislature, apart from those that have been excised.33
The difficulty here is that hypothetical intent is quite speculative.34 It can
perhaps be given some content by reference to legislative purpose, or to the
“enterprise” to which the statute belongs.35 But it can easily deteriorate into
a question of what ought to happen, in which case “legislative intent” adds
nothing.
A third possibility is to concede that legislative intent on the question of
severability is elusive or nonexistent, and to decide on other grounds.
Under the prevailing test of severability, for example, the question whether
remaining provisions can stand as a coherent statute can be viewed as a
question independent of legislative intent.36 Another example can be
found in the special treatment courts give to statutes regulating expression.
When statutes of this kind are “substantially overbroad” in the sense that
they forbid a significant amount of constitutionally protected expression,
courts refuse to treat the statutes as severable, and permit challengers whose
own activities are not protected to challenge the statutes in their entirety.37
The reason for this is that overbroad statutes are thought to deter the
30. This test was proposed by Robert Stern in 1937. Stern, supra note 2, at 98.
31. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 685 (1987); Warren v. Mayor of
Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854).
32. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686 (severability clause raises presumption of severability); Stern, supra note 2, at 114–18, 121–25 (discussing severability clauses).
33. See materials cited supra note 12.
34. See Nagle, supra note 2, at 230. Mark Movsesian has argued that an approach based on
hypothetical intent equates interpretation of statutes, which address and bind a large number
of parties, with interpretation of contracts, which are two-party bargains. Movsesian, supra note
2, at 58–59, 66–73.
35. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
Constitutions, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189–91 (1986) (conceiving interpretation as a
process in which the judge acts as a subordinate faced with a failed communication, and asks
what action will best carry out the “enterprise” in which the legislature is engaged).
36. See, e.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932) (invalid provisions can be severed “if what is left is fully operative as a law”); Nagle, supra
note 2, at 215–16 (describing this as an “objective” component of the inquiry). Of course, the
incoherence of the remaining provisions can be characterized as a reason to believe the
legislature would not intend a severance, see Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (“Congress could
not have intended [severance] if the balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning
independently”), but incoherence rather than intent is doing most of the work.
37. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (facial review); Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (substantial overbreadth). See generally Alexander, supra note
7; Fallon, supra note 7; Hill, supra note 7; Monaghan, supra note 7. At least, federal courts will
not presume that state statutes are severable. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 283–85.
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exercise of important rights. The practice of facial invalidation removes the
immediate deterrent, and may also encourage legislatures to be especially
careful when they regulate expression.38 In any event, courts applying
overbreadth doctrine are acting for constitutional or prophylactic reasons
that are independent of the statute itself.39 The obvious question raised by
a non-intent-based approach to severability is, What should count as reason
for or against severance?40
A final approach is to set aside particularized inquiry into either legislative
intent or the desirability of severance, and instead establish a rule or presumption governing severability and as-applied adjudication. The Supreme
Court’s statements about as-applied decision making represent a strong
presumption in favor of that practice;41 its statements about severability are
less clear but suggest that a favorable presumption is at work.42 An alternative would be to establish a clear statement rule to the effect that courts will
consider statutes fully severable unless the legislature provides otherwise.43
Commentators have suggested a number of reasons in support of a
presumption favoring severability and as-applied adjudication. Severance of
38. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 7, at 867–70, 884–88 (“chilling effect”), 887 (incentives for
legislatures).
39. On the distinction between constitutional and prophylactic versions of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, see Fallon, id. at 867–75 (finding both constitutional and prophylactic bases for overbreadth). See also Alexander, supra note 7, at 552–54 (proposing a balance
between governmental interests in particular forms of law and protection of First Amendment
rights); Dorf, supra note 1, at 261–64 (characterizing overbreadth as one instance of a constitutional non-severability principle in cases of fundamental rights); Monaghan, supra note 7, at
8–23 (suggesting that overbreadth is not a special First Amendment doctrine, but an application of the general constitutional right to be judged by valid laws, in a context that demands
that laws regulate by the least restrictive means).
40. In this article, I shall have little to say about constitutional reasons for refusing to sever
statutes, such as First Amendment overbreadth. Instead, I shall suggest a further set of criteria
for severance and similar practices, which are based on the fact that these practices produce
new legal rules, and are independent of both constitutional considerations and legislative
intent. For my purposes, overbreadth stands as a special constitutional reason—independent
of the concerns I raise about the justification of rules—for refusing to sever or uphold a statute
as applied. I assume that overbreadth trumps whatever conclusions may arise from the analysis
of severability and related questions that I propose.
In any event, my analysis is focused primarily on judicial review within a single jurisdiction—that is, federal court review of federal statutes or state court review of state statutes—which is not likely to be much affected by overbreadth. Commentators on overbreadth
assume that within a jurisdiction, the fact that a statute regulates expression does not prevent
the court from adopting a narrowing interpretation. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 7, at 877 (the
effect of a Supreme Court overbreadth decision is that “the statute cannot be enforced until
the state’s courts provide a narrowing construction”). To the extent that the overbreadth
doctrine is based on the immediate deterrent effect of a particular statute on First Amendment
rights, a narrowing interpretation eliminates the problem. To the extent the doctrine serves to
provide legislatures with incentives to be cautious when enacting statutes that affect important
constitutional rights, perhaps it should preclude narrowing interpretations, even within a
single jurisdiction; but that is a problem for First Amendment theorists.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
42. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1987) (finding “no need to resort
to a presumption”).
43. John Nagle makes this proposal. Nagle, supra note 2, at 253–58.
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valid from invalid applications of statutes is said to honor legislative supremacy,44 to avoid unnecessary constitutional decision making,45 and to limit
judicial decision making to concrete cases arising from live disputes.46
Severance also avoids a cumbersome process of re-enactment and accompanying loss of social benefits, particularly when the legislature has enacted
a statute in omnibus form.47 The problem with a rule or presumption in
favor of severability and as-applied adjudication is that it is very blunt.
Unless more errors of all types will be avoided by a uniform outcome than
by individualized decision making on the question of severability, a rule or
presumption may be a mistake.
The following discussion assumes that although severability is a question
of interpretation in the sense that authority over what should happen to a
failed statute lies with the legislature, it is also a question on which a search
for legislative intent—that is, intent about specific severability problems
that arise in constitutional adjudication—will normally be fruitless.48 The
exception is the case in which a legislature did anticipate a particular
challenge, and provided for it; then the structure of government dictates
44. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 292 (severability is supported by the principle “that courts will
not disturb Congressional policies reflected in legislation except insofar as the constitution
requires”); Movsesian, supra note 2, at 80 (“separation-of-powers concerns”); Nagle, supra note
2, at 251 (severability honors the principle that “a court should give effect to a statute to the
maximum extent permitted by the Constitution”); Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1961 (severance
is designed to “put into effect . . . as broad a range of applications as possible”).
45. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 292 (severability can promote “judicial restraint”); Nagle, supra
note 2, at 250–51 (severance avoids constitutional questions). But see Vermeule, supra note 3,
at 1950–52 (distinguishing between “ius tertii severance,” in which the court upholds the
application of a statute to the case before it and avoids a decision on the constitutionality of
other applications, and “severance proper,” in which the court finds the statute to be invalid
as applied but also decides that other potential applications are valid; in the latter case, the
court does not avoid constitutional decision making).
46. See Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1867–69 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
against facial invalidation of statutes); Dorf, supra note 1, at 246 (discussing possible rationales
for a view of constitutional rights as privileging particular actions, but ultimately rejecting such
a view).
47. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 80–81 (“severability comports with present legislative
practice); Nagle, supra note 2, at 251–52 (referring to “empirical realities of the legislative
process”).
48. I have referred at several places in the text to interpretation and to noninterpretive judicial rulemaking. Implicit in these references, and in my later discussion of the functions of rules,
is a particular conception of interpretation that focuses on authors’ intent. Very briefly, I understand the meaning of a statute or other rule to be the meaning the rulemaking authority intended the words of the rule to have. The text of the rule is good, but not conclusive, evidence of
intent. It follows from this conception of meaning that when a court departs from the authority’s
intent—whether on the basis of the literal meaning of words, underlying purposes the rule was
designed to promote, or independent moral ideals to which the words can (or cannot) be
fit—the court is engaged in a noninterpretive practice, and has in effect assumed the position of
a rulemaking authority. This view is expressed in much more detail in Larry Alexander & Emily
Sherwin, PAST IMPERFECT: RULES, PRINCIPLES, AND DILEMMAS OF LAW ch. 4 (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author). On the many problems connected to interpretation, see generally
Kent Greenawalt, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS (1999); Keith E. Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999);
LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
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that the legislative decision must prevail. Otherwise, courts must answer the
question of severability on other grounds. I suggest below that decisions
about severability and as-applied decision making should take into account
the effect of severance and related practices in establishing new rules, and
the relative competence of courts and legislatures to perform the rulemaking function. To explain, I begin with a brief outline of the nature and
function of rules.
II. SEVERABILITY AND RULES
A. Justification of Legal Rules
A discussion of rules must begin by defining the term rule.49 For my purposes, a rule is a directive issued in determinate form.50 Laws range along
a continuum from quite determinate rules to standards whose meaning
cannot be grasped without an exercise of moral judgment.51 A standard
identifies a moral ideal, but leaves the practical requirements of that ideal
undefined and unsettled. At the determinate end of the continuum, legal
rules serve the additional function of settling controversy over the practical
implications of whatever end has been selected, and guiding conduct accordingly.52
For example, suppose that a society has determined, through its legislative body, that distributive justice requires regulation of rental markets. The
legislature might respond with a standard of conduct, “no unfair rent
increases.” Alternatively, it might enact an ordinance prohibiting annual
rent increases in excess of increases in the Consumer Price Index
(“CPI”)—a highly determinate rule.
A rule, then, is based on some less determinate moral principle, but
restates the principle in concrete terms.53 The justification for choosing a
determinate rule over a standard that refers more directly to the underlying
moral ideal lies in the capacity of rules to prevent errors.54 The benefits of

49. For a comprehensive analysis of the nature of and justifications for rules, see Frederick
Schauer, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING
(1991).
50. See id. at 53–62 (defending the possibility of “semantic autonomy”); Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 520–32 (1988) (defending the capacity of rules to constrain
decision making).
51. On the distinction between rules and standards, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 21–34 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); William Powers, Jr., Structural Aspects of the Impact of
Law on Moral Duty Within Utlitarianism and Social Contract Theory, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1263 (1979);
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
52. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 48, ch. 1.
53. See Schauer, supra note 49, at 54 (rules are “instantiations” of background principles).
54. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 48, ch. 1 at 6–9, ch. 5 at 5–6; Joseph Raz, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 70–80 (1986); Schauer, supra note 49, at 149–55.
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rules can be sorted roughly into two categories: epistemic guidance and
coordination.
The epistemic benefits of rules lie in their capacity to reduce errors that
occur because individual actors lack information or expertise. Armed with
only a moral standard, such as distributive justice or “fair” rent, people may
be unable to make correct judgments because they do not have enough
economic facts. In contrast, a rulemaking body may have fact-finding
capacities that give it an epistemic advantage over most actors. If, after
gathering information and listening to views, the rulemaker has superior
information, actors may do better by following its rule than they would do
if they relied on their own judgment.55
A second type of error results from lack of coordination. Actors may err
in applying a standard such as distributive justice because what that standard requires of them depends on the conduct of others, and they have no
means of anticipating what others will do. A rule, if generally followed,
makes the behavior of others predictable and puts an end to the argument
and controversy that come from uncertainty.56
The term coordination is used broadly here, to include the settlement of
standards of conduct that may be morally controversial but are necessary to
a stable social order. Thus, in the simplest sense of coordination, an ordinance limiting rent increases to increases in the CPI provides coordination—even if it does not represent what is fair in every case—because it tells
property owners what their legal duties are and what they can expect from
officials. Moreover, at a higher level of generality, the determination that
distributive justice requires rent control, or that distributive justice is a
social good, also provides coordination because it settles (legally) an area
of moral controversy and uncertainty.57
Of course, most legal rules represent (or aspire to represent) a combination of legislative expertise and coordination: There is a need to designate
some course of action, and the legislature has reason to believe that one
course is better than others. However, although rules can provide benefits
55. For sources recognizing the expertise function of rules, see, e.g., Tom Campbell, THE
LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 51, 58 (1996); Schauer, supra note 49, at 150–52, 158–59;
Jules L. Coleman, Authority and Reason, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 287, 305 (R. George ed.,
1996).
56. On the coordination function of rules, see, e.g., Raz, supra note 54, at 49–50; Schauer,
supra note 49, at 163–66; Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203,
2293–3201 (1992); Gerald Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165, 172–86; Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1006–10 (1989). On the requirement that the rule must be
generally followed in order to have a coordinating effect, see Alexander & Sherwin, supra note
48, ch. 5 at 20–23.
57. Whether people accept the settlement is another matter. See generally Alexander &
Sherwin, supra note 48, ch. 5 (discussing the difficulty of enforcing authoritative rules); Heidi
M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991) (rejecting the “practical authority” of
legal rules). Without acceptance by those who might otherwise disagree about ends, means, or
particular applications, rules have no coordinating effect. Here I assume that, in general, the
rules are accepted.
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in the form of coordination and expertise, they also can produce errors in
several ways. Most obviously, the rule may be poorly designed, due to the
rulemaker’s faulty judgment or lack of expertise. A rule limiting rent increases may not in fact benefit tenants as expected, and a shift in wealth to
tenants may not serve distributive justice. If so, the rule will not serve the
desired moral end.
More subtly, even a good rule can, and almost certainly will, produce
errors in some of its applications.58 Rules are blunt, because they do not
restate the moral principle on which they depend, but instead reduce these
principles to a set of instructions about what to do in specified circumstances. As a result, some of the rules’ applications will depart from the
principles that support them. Even if we assume that limiting rent increases
to increases in the CPI will, overall, promote distributive justice, it is not
likely to promote distributive justice in every case.
Another type of rule-induced error, related to the first two, occurs when
the rule provokes strategies of circumvention, with unintended consequences. Because a rule is a fixed directive that operates prospectively on a
range of events that have not yet occurred, it can create incentives that alter
the course of those events. Typically, there will be some actors who, for
reasons of self-interest or moral dissent, do not agree with the moral
premises underlying a rule. And even if we assume that all actors share the
rulemaker’s moral premises and want to do what is morally right, there will
be those who believe, rightly or wrongly, that the rule is mistaken in its
application to them. Rather than disobey and incur sanctions, these actors
may alter their conduct in an effort to avoid the rule.
Problems of this kind result from a combination of bluntness and poor
design. The determinate form of the rule makes circumvention possible: If
actors were governed directly by the standard “Act so as to provide distributive justice,” they might disobey, but they could not avoid the law. In
contrast, the distributive consequences of a rent control ordinance are
comparatively easy to avoid, namely, by shifting to other uses of property. If
this tactic was not anticipated and if it ultimately produces a detriment in
terms of distributive justice, the rule may do more harm than good.
At least in theory, there can be perfect rules. If two different courses of
action are available to actors, and there are good reasons why everyone
should act alike, but no good reasons to prefer one alternative over another,
a rule that designates one course of action and prohibits the other will serve
its moral end in every case to which it applies, and no one will seek to avoid
the rule.59 The standard example is a rule requiring that in two-way traffic,
58. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 49, at 31–34, 47–52 (underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness).
59. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 48, ch. 4 at 15–16 (equivocation rules); Regan,
supra note 56, at 1025–26 (explaining that such enactment of a rule provides actors with a
reason to believe that others will do as the rule requires, which in turn provides a reason to act
accordingly).
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everyone must stay to the right. But pure coordination rules are rare, and
most determinate rules are subject to errors in design and errors of bluntness, and to the related problem of circumvention.
Thus, determinate rules have both benefits that arise from expertise,
coordination, and settlement, and costs that arise from poor design and
bluntness. It follows that the choice of a determinate rule is justified when,
and only when, the rule has net compliance benefits: Judged by the underlying reasons on which the rule is based, fewer errors will occur if
everyone complies with the rule than would occur if everyone judges
independently what he ought to do.60 In other words, rules serve moral
ends indirectly, by providing an imperfect set of instructions that works
better, overall, than a series of judgments about what to do in particular
cases.61 I do not mean to suggest that this is in fact what motivates legislators to enact determinate rules, or that courts should police statutes
to ensure that they produce net compliance benefits.62 But these are the
conditions under which a determinate rule is preferable to a standard
or to no rule at all.
A standard, in contrast, may be useful when the criteria for adopting
a determinate rule are not met. If the legislature has settled on an objective or moral principle, but does not have sufficient information to
draft a rule that will prevent more error than it causes, a standard allows
individual actors, and judges as they adjudicate particular disputes, to determine the best means of carrying out the principle it expresses.63 Over
time, a series of decisions interpreting the standard may give it more
determinate form.
A final general point about legal rules is that they include both primary
rules of conduct and secondary rules that identify what counts as an
authoritative rule of conduct and provide for the amendment of primary
rules.64 Rules that identify the legislature and govern its decision-making
processes, for example, are secondary rules. On a positivist view of law, the
authority of both primary and secondary rules rests ultimately on their
acceptance by those who are subject to the rules.65

60. See Raz, supra note 54, at 70–80 (discussing the “normal justification” of rules); Schauer,
supra note 49, at 149–55; Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Legal Rules,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1994–98; Coleman, supra note 55, at 304–05.
61. See Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good—Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985).
62. Public choice theory, for example, raises serious doubts about orderly pursuit of public
good through legislation. See generally, Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 U. VA. L.
REV. 167 (1988).
63. See H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121–23 (1961) (discussing the use of standards).
64. See id. at 77–96 (discussing secondary rules in a mature legal system).
65. See Joseph Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 42–43 (1979) (efficaciousness). At a minimum,
officials must accept the rules and subjects must accept the basic secondary rule that gives
officials their authority. See Hart, supra note 63, at 94 (on the “rule of recognition”).
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B. The Role of Rules in Judicial Review
1. A Rule-Oriented Analysis of Severability
Part I of this article describes a collection of principles that work to preserve
parts of legislation in the course of adverse judicial review. Courts may
uphold a statute as applied despite doubts about other applications, or hold
the statute unconstitutional as applied and leave it otherwise in force; they
may hold that invalid applications or the statute are severable from valid
applications; or they may provide a saving construction that they would not
endorse in the absence of constitutional problems. In each case, the product of the court’s decision is a new law.
The first conclusion to be drawn from this observation is that the new law
that will result from severance or similar judicial action should be judged as
a rule. It is not enough that severance will enable the court to reach a
desirable result; nor should the court assume that partial enforcement of
legislative policy is better than no enforcement at all. Because severance or
a saving interpretation replaces one rule with another, the use of either
should depend on whether the new rule that results is consistent with the
original rule and justified in its own right.
There are two parts to this test. First, the principle or goal served by the
original statute should remain constant, in deference to the legislature’s
primary role in settling public policy. Second, the new rule should be
justified in the sense that, judged by the original principle or goal, it will
produce net compliance benefits. In other words, the rule must prevent
more errors of judgment through coordination and expertise than it causes
through poor design or bluntness.
Notice that “legislative supremacy,” in the sense of hierarchical authority,
plays no part in the critical question whether the rule is a justified rule. Nor
should it, because either of the available courses of action—invalidating the
entire statute or upholding a part of the statute—can be characterized as
an act of judicial deference to the legislature (or as an act of judicial
aggression). One can say that courts respect legislative prerogative when
they preserve what they can of partly invalid statutes; one can also say that
courts respect legislative prerogative when they decline to substitute new,
narrower rules in place of the rules originally enacted. In fact, the court is
acting aggressively in both cases, either by eradicating legislation or by
replacing it with a new rule.
Because the court cannot defer, it must face the question of rulemaking
and ask how the remaining portions or applications of the statute will
function as a rule. This inquiry can be characterized as an inquiry into
hypothetical legislative intent: Given the failure of part of its statute, a
legislature presumably would approve of a rule that produced net benefits
and disapprove of a rule that did not. It seems more forthright, however, to
think of what the court is doing as an independent analysis carried out in
the absence of any discernible legislative intent.
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For a simple example of how a rule-oriented analysis might work, suppose
that a rent control ordinance limits rent increases to increases in the CPI,
prevents termination of leases as long as rent is paid, and flatly prohibits
conversion of rental property to other uses. This ordinance is challenged
by a landlord who has no plans for conversion. The court concludes that
the basic rent control provision is valid. It also concludes—improbably66—that the unqualified ban on conversion amounts to an unconstitutional taking of property.
In these circumstances, the court can find the statute severable and
enforce it as applied to the challenger, or find it nonseverable and therefore
unenforceable in any of its applications. Severance will prevent the landlord
who initiated the case from raising rent—a satisfying result if one accepts
the legislative premise that rent control is just. On a rule-oriented view,
however, the question is not whether the result is in accord with legislative
intent, but whether the new rule of rent control without limits on conversion is a sound rule. This is less obvious: Under some economic conditions,
the new rule might encourage rapid conversions from rental property to
condominium or commercial use, an undesirable result if one accepts the
legislative premise. Thus, the problem looks somewhat different when
treated as a problem of rules than as one of results.
Another example is suggested by the aftermath of Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego.67 San Diego had enacted an ordinance that banned most billboards
and required existing billboards to be retired over time. The United States
Supreme Court held that the ordinance was valid insofar as it banned
commercial billboards but invalid with respect to noncommercial billboards.68 It then remanded the case to the California Supreme Court for
consideration of severability or saving interpretation.

66. The Supreme Court has made clear that rent control is not, in itself, an unconstitutional
taking of private property. See Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (finding a taking claim
premature when tenant hardship was only one among seven factors to be considered in
approving rent increases). In Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), the Court upheld a set of
regulations on mobile-home pad rentals that controlled rents and also limited landlords’
choice of tenants, limited the grounds for terminating leases, and prevented landlords from
charging fees or removing mobile homes in case of sale. The Court suggested, however, that if
the law had prohibited termination of leases and conversion of property to other leases, either
explicitly or as applied, this might amount to a “physical” taking. Id. at 528. It also suggested
that strict limits on landlords’ ability to choose among tenants could result in a regulatory
taking, but then strained to conclude that the issue of regulatory taking was not properly
before the Court. Id. at 530–31, 535–38.
67. 453 U.S. 490 (1981), on remand to the Supreme Court of California 32 Cal. 3d 180 (1982).
68. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 500–515. The California Supreme Court had held that the
ordinance was valid on its face but invalid as applied to noncommercial billboards when there
were no good alternatives open to particular speakers. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 26 Cal.
3d 848, 869 n.14 (1980). The United States Supreme Court held the ordinance invalid with
respect to all noncommercial speech at least when the ordinance as written preferred commercial to noncommercial speech and attempted to regulate the content of noncommercial
billboards by allowing some types of noncommercial displays and prohibiting others. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 512–515.
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The California court determined that the ordinance was plainly intended
to cover noncommercial billboards, and that, despite a general severability
clause, its applications to commercial billboards could not be severed from
its applications to noncommercial billboards.69 The reasoning of the California court tracks, at least loosely, the analysis I have suggested. The court
might simply have concluded that any billboard removed from the road is
a partial realization of the legislative goal, therefore the ordinance should
be severed. Instead it considered how the new rule (banning commercial
billboards only) would operate as a rule. The new rule might encourage a
shift in billboard use from commercial to noncommercial messages, and
would require municipal enforcers to police the content of rapidly changing billboards.70 It also might be inferior to a rule regulating the location
and appearance of all billboards.71 Therefore, there was no assurance that
the rule resulting from severance would be a sound rule, and a good chance
that the legislature might have done something better.
I do not mean to suggest that the rule-oriented analysis I have described
represents a dramatic new approach to severability and related issues. At
least when the issue is characterized as one of severability, courts may
engage in roughly the analysis I have proposed when they consider whether
the legislature “would have enacted” the remaining provisions of the statute. This appeared to be the case in Metromedia. But an explicit recognition
of the effect of the decision as creating a new rule, coupled with an
understanding of the circumstances under which rules are justified, can
help to avoid the facile assumption that partial enforcement of a statute is
better than no enforcement. An explicitly rule-oriented analysis may also
suggest some useful distinctions among types of statutes; I will attempt to
sketch some of these below. Finally, a rule-oriented analysis casts doubt on
current doctrine pertaining to as-applied adjudication and saving interpretation, which leans heavily in favor of narrowing rather than invalidating
legislation, and thus discourages critical consideration of the resulting rule.
Summarizing to this point: A rule-oriented approach to partially invalid
statutes suggests that courts should not replace the original legislation with
a new rule unless they are confident that the new rule will produce a
favorable balance of error, in light of the moral principle or goal underlying
the original legislation. Errors prevented through expertise and coordination must exceed errors resulting from the bluntness of the rule. If these
requirements are not met, there is no reason to assume that the new rule is
preferable to no rule at all.
It does not follow, however, that the court itself should examine the
justification of the new rule in the manner just described. Rather, unless the
net benefits of the rule are obvious, the court should first consider which
body—itself or the legislature—is best positioned to issue a rule. If the court
69. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 32 Cal. 3d 180, 186–90 (1982).
70. Id. at 190.
71. Id. at 191.
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refuses to sever or otherwise save a partly invalid statute, the effect of its
decision is to assign the rulemaking task to the legislature. Therefore, in a
case of even moderate difficulty, comparative institutional competence
should be a threshold question preceding direct analysis of the justification
of the rule.
Once again, the standard reference to legislative supremacy is not helpful. A decision to sever a statute may honor legislative supremacy by preserving as much legislation as possible; then again, a decision not to sever
honors legislative supremacy by assuming that the legislature is the superior
rulemaker. What is needed, therefore, is a direct comparison of legislative
and judicial rulemaking, given that the original rule cannot be left in place.
Although legislatures are surely subject to distorting influence in their
choice of ends, they ordinarily are superior to courts as rulemaking bodies.
Rulemaking involves choosing a set of determinate criteria for action that,
if generally accepted, will serve to promote a given end. To do this effectively, the rulemaker must assess how the rule will operate over a range of
future cases. Because a court must judge rules from the vantage point of a
single dispute, without the benefit of legislative fact-finding tools and without having heard the views of many affected parties, its judgment about the
overall effects of a rule may be inaccurate. Cognitive science suggests that
human minds are disposed to miscalculate probabilities because they focus
on salient facts at the expense of equally relevant background conditions.72
The process of adjudication, with its focus on the positions of particular
individuals, invites this kind of bias. Moreover, at least if one accepts democratic premises, a legislature is better able to resolve moral controversy
through compromise. Courts are neither authorized by political processes,
nor equipped by access to public opinion, to settle contested questions.
Of course, courts do make rules, but they normally proceed in the
incremental manner associated with the common law.73 Over the course of
a series of individual decisions, the courts begin to pick out rules that
connect the cases and appear to be justified as rules for future cases as well.
This process, which has similarities to the process of reflective equilibrium,
works to counteract adjudicatory bias.74 In contrast, when a court amends
a statute through severance or a similar device, there is no opportunity for
incremental development of a new rule: The court must act at once. For
this purpose, courts have serious shortcomings.
72. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 163–65, 174–78
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
73. On the nature and virtues of analogical reasoning in law, see, for example, Anthony
Kronman, THE LOST LAWYER 170–85 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, LEGAL REASONING & POLITICAL
CONFLICT 62–100 (1996); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the
Rational Force of Legal Argument By Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Emily Sherwin, A
Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, (1999). For strong criticism of
analogical reasoning, see Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57 (1996).
74. See Sherwin, supra note 73. On reflective equilibrium, see John Rawls, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 46–53 (1971); Brewer, supra note 73, at 938–39, 963, 1023.

316

EMILY SHERWIN

All else being equal, the shortcomings of courts as rulemakers would
indicate that courts should not assume rulemaking responsibility through
severance and related practices, but instead should return the rulemaking
task to the legislature. In the context of adverse judicial review, however,
legislative action has costs as well in the form of delay and disruption. The
benefits (if any) of a reduced form of the statute are lost, at least temporarily. Further, complete invalidation of the statute usually brings about a
greater change in law than partial invalidation. Change creates uncertainty,
and uncertainty generates errors and costs as actors try to anticipate what
will happen next.
Thus, as an initial step in determining whether severance or similar
judicial action is the right way to proceed, courts should compare their own
shortcomings as rulemakers with the potential costs of postponed legislation. There is no metric for this comparison, but it should at least be
possible to judge whether disruption and delay are likely to be extensive,
and to identify some contexts in which courts are more or less competent
as rulemakers. For this purpose, much will depend on the characteristics of
the statute at issue.
When the original, partly invalid statute is a law of general application
with roots in the common law, there is a strong case for severance or
as-applied adjudication. Consider, for example, a trespass statute found to
be unconstitutional when applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses distributing leaflets in a company town.75 Having found one application of the statute
unconstitutional, the court has a choice whether to invalidate the statute in
its entirety or only as applied.76 The effect of an as-applied decision would
be to replace a very general but determinate rule (“Do not enter another’s
property without consent”) with a slightly narrower determinate rule (“Do
not enter another’s property without consent, except to distribute literature
in a company town”).
In this case, complete invalidation of the statute would cause considerable disruption by temporarily eliminating a basic form of protection for
property rights in land. Because the trespass statute is largely intact, it is also
fair to assume that if the original statute was justified, so too is the revision.
Moreover, the court’s qualifications as a rulemaker are at their strongest
because the statute itself incorporates a body of property law developed by
courts in the manner of the common law.
Judicial revision of statutes through severance, as-applied adjudication,
or narrowing interpretation may also be warranted if the rule in question
is based mainly on coordination rather than expertise. In other words,
75. Marsh v. Alabama, 326, U.S. 501. I am assuming that the threat this statute poses to other
First Amendment rights is insubstantial, so that the question of severability has no constitutional dimension. On this point see Alexander, who argues for a balance between the deterrent
effect the statute may have on expression and the legislative interest in regulating trespass by
means of a broad prohibition. Alexander, supra note 7, at 552–54 (1981).
76. A saving construction is implausible in this type of case.
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some rule is necessary, but not much turns on which rule is selected.
Suppose that the legislature enacts a traffic rule that imposes penalties
for “driving on the wrong side of the road,” and the court finds the law
to be unconstitutionally vague.77 Despite the traditional hostility to judicial
line-drawing and “rewriting” of statutes, it seems well within the court’s
competence to fix this statute by choosing “left” as the prohibited side.
For coordination, what is needed is not expertise or unbiased fact-finding
about a field of potential applications of the rule, but only a choice by
someone with authority. If there is a reason for judicial reluctance to
make this kind of revision, it is the risk of mistaking a pure coordination
problem for one that involves a choice among unequal and controversial
alternatives.78
In contrast, when the new rule depends for its justification on the rulemaker’s expertise or on settlement of contested moral questions, and the
original statute was not a comprehensive enactment of common law, a court
should be wary of exceeding its rulemaking competence. For example, a
decision to sever an invalid anticonversion provision from an otherwise
valid rent control ordinance requires a determination that rent control
without conversion limits will not be self-defeating. Similarly, a decision to
read a rule “Do not drive too fast” to mean “Do not drive more than 55 miles
per hour” requires a determination that a desirable speed for a safe and
efficient traffic flow is 55. A decision to uphold a child care statute, but to
sever an unconstitutional provision allowing parents to apply federal funds
to religious day care, requires a determination that provision of some funds
for day care justifies favoring secular over religious providers. Given the
inferiority of courts as rulemakers—their retrospective adjudicatory bias,
their limited fact-finding processes, and their lack of political authority to
settle moral controversy—the current assumption that courts ordinarily
should make these determinations seems out of place. In particular, the
strong presumption in favor of as-applied adjudication and saving interpretation is unjustified.
The same considerations suggest that it is not a good idea for legislatures
to include blanket severability clauses in statutes. General severability
clauses are likely to have been enacted with no specific constitutional
challenge in mind, and so cannot be viewed as deliberate exercises in
backup rulemaking by legislatures. The best argument for judicial enforcement of severability clauses is that the court must honor all explicit provisions in order to maintain a general rule of judicial respect for statutory
77. Criminal statutes deny due process of law when they are too vague and uncertain to
provide fair notice of what is required. See, e.g., Larzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939)
(“A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.”).
78. In effect, it may be wise to adopt a rule against judicial rewriting of statutes because,
although the rule is inapt in pure coordination cases, it prevents mistakes of judgment about
when expertise is needed, and thus prevents more errors than it creates.
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text.79 In a great many cases that have nothing to do with severability, the
rule of respect for the text is sound because it recognizes the comparative
shortcomings of courts as rulemakers; and perhaps a practice of ignoring
the text in severability cases is subversive of the general rule. But from the
legislative point of view, severability clauses seem an unwise delegation of
rulemaking power unless they refer to specific provisions and are based on
a conscious consideration of the possibility of severance.80
Another question that may bear on the rulemaking competence of courts
and legislatures is whether the rule under consideration is a primary rule
of conduct or a secondary rule—that is, a rule governing the issuance and
authority of conduct rules. When severability or related questions arise in
connection with a secondary rule, the problem of justifying a new rule is
more complex, though similar in substance. A revised secondary rule is
justified if it will result in conduct rules that yield net benefits.
As an example, consider the problem of legislative vetoes.81 Before 1983,
a large number of federal statutes delegated rulemaking power to agencies,
but provided for a veto of executive rules by one house of Congress. The
Supreme Court finally held these vetoes unconstitutional, creating a widespread problem of severability.82 Perhaps sensing that much disruption
would follow if it invalidated complex legislation on matters such as immigration and airline deregulation, the Court decided several cases in favor of
severability, finding that Congress “would have enacted” the statutes without vetoes.83 Severance of an invalid legislative veto, however, is a risky
undertaking by the court. To justify the resulting new secondary rule, which
decreases legislative oversight of agency rulemaking, it must be the case that
agency rules—subject to repeal only through a full legislative process—will
yield net benefits to society. A judgment of this kind is highly demanding of
information and expertise, and the legislative veto provision suggests that
the legislature itself had doubts about potential agency rules. Perhaps the
disruption that would follow from invalidating the statutes in question was
enough to overcome the risks of the judge-made secondary rule. But if that
is the case, it seems better to face the comparison directly than to ask what
Congress would have intended about severability.84
79. Cf. Nagle, supra note 2, at 234–35 (advocating a “plain meaning” rule for severability
clauses, consistent with judicial treatment of other statutory provisions).
80. See Stern, supra note 2, at 122–23 (suggesting that severability clauses are not wellthought-out by legislatures). For an instance in which Congress appears to have consciously
considered the effects of severability, see Nagle, supra note 2, at 241.
81. Severability of legislative veto provisions is discussed in Nagle, supra note 2, at 204–05 &
n.6 (collecting other sources); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any
Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21–27 (1984).
82. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59 (1983).
83. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1987); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931–35, 959
(relying on severability clause).
84. John Nagle reaches the contrary conclusion that the speculative nature of hypothetical
Congressional intent supports a focus on actual intent with respect to severability, coupled with
a plain statement rule in favor of severability. Nagle, supra note 2, at 230, 232–58.
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2. Formal Considerations
In formal terms, most of the examples discussed in the previous section
involved the replacement of a determinate statute with a new rule that is
still in determinate form. Severance of an invalid anticonversion provision
from an otherwise valid rent control ordinance, for example, results in an
equally determinate new rule. The formal consequences of severance, asapplied adjudication, and narrowing interpretation, however, do not always
follow this pattern.
One variation occurs when a court revises a determinate rule by introducing a narrowing standard. For example, the court might hold that the rent
control ordinance is valid except as applied to landlords suffering economic
hardship. The result is considerably further toward the standard-end of the
formal continuum than is the original law, because hardship is a controversial term entailing questions about distributive justice.
In this situation, there is a special reason for caution, beyond the question
of judicial competence to make rules. The court is changing not only the
substance of the rule, but its form. A determinate rule represents a decision
by the legislature to regulate by rule. As explained earlier, a determinate
rule may produce error because it is blunt, but it also can prevent errors of
judgment by actors and courts, or other bodies charged with administering
the rule. If determinacy is important to the ends of the legislation, the court
should either try to find a determinate alternative (subject to considerations of competence), or invalidate the statute in its entirety and return the
rulemaking task to the legislature.
In other cases, the original legislation may take the form of a standard,
which the court replaces with something closer to a determinate rule. Here,
the analysis changes. Suppose, for example, that a rent control ordinance
imposes criminal penalties for “unreasonable rent increases.” The statute is
challenged by a landlord who has quadrupled rent in an effort to drive out
existing tenants, on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague. The
ordinance undoubtably is vague, but there is a qualification to the constitutional requirement of clarity in penal statutes, to the effect that one whose
conduct is clearly covered cannot raise the claim of vagueness.85 Therefore,
the court might agree that the ordinance is too vague but uphold it as
applied to this landlord, on the ground that he must have known it covered
sudden and very large increases designed to drive out tenants. When it does
this, the court moves the statute in the direction of determinacy. We now
85. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494–95 (1975) (“A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the law as applied to others.”); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 31 (1963) (upholding a provision of the Robinson-Patman Act that forbade the selling
at “unreasonably low prices” as applied to a dairy that sold milk below cost) (“In determining
the sufficiency of notice, a statute must of necessity be examined in light of the conduct with
which the defendant is charged.”). When vague statutes affect the exercise of First Amendment
rights, the court has reached the opposite result and allowed facial challenges. See, e.g., Coates
v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (conduct “annoying to persons passing by”).
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know one type of case that is definitely covered. And it is possible that over
time, the statute will gain a body of determinate content in the course of
similar decisions.
This seems a particularly strong case for judicial rulemaking. Recall that a
standard is preferable to a rule when the rulemaker has in mind an end or
value to be served, but does not yet have the information or expertise
necessary to reduce that end to a determinate rule that will prevent more
error than it causes.86 Thus, when a legislature chooses to enact a law in the
form of a standard, it may lack the information needed for a rule. In these
circumstances, the best way to acquire information and expertise about
specific cases that fall within the scope of the standard may be to proceed in
the incremental manner of the common law, deciding concrete cases as they
arise and developing more concrete rules over time. In effect, the initial
standard is an invitation to the court to move in this way toward a rule.
The court’s competence to revise a statutory standard, however, depends
on this incremental mode of decision making. The court is certainly no
better equipped than the legislature, and probably less well equipped, to
issue a rule at the outset. Thus a process of gradual narrowing through
as-applied decisions that identify permissible and impermissible applications is preferable to a comprehensive saving construction. The court
should avoid holding immediately that “unreasonable rent increases”
means “rent increases in excess of the landlord’s costs.”
3. The Possibility of a Rule
The preceding sections suggest a variety of considerations that might enter
into a court’s analysis of whether to sever or otherwise alter a particular
statute in the course of adverse judicial review. One alternative to an analysis
of this kind would be to establish a flat rule one way or the other: “Always
sever,” or “Never sever,” or perhaps “Sever unless the statute targets expression.” Although the Supreme Court has preferred case-by-case decision
making to a rule on the question of severability, some of its statements on
as-applied adjudication and narrowing interpretation come close to establishing a rule in favor of these practices.87
A rule for or against severability, as-applied adjudication, or narrowing
interpretation must meet the general standard for justification of rules. That
is, the rule is justified if it will prevent more errors of judgment by courts in
particular cases than it will cause by preempting correct decisions in particular cases. Although a rule would certainly simplify decision making, the
86. There are reasons apart from lack of expertise why a legislature might choose a relatively
open-ended standard. For example, a standard deters actors from operating close to the line
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Over time, however, a highly indeterminate
standard cannot provide the benefits of settlement and guidance, nor produce consistency in
adjudication, because it leaves too much room for judgment on morally controversial questions. Therefore, courts will naturally tend to move standards in the direction of determinacy.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (as-applied adjudication); De
Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Counsel, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (saving construction).
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relative rulemaking competence of courts and legislatures varies sufficiently
with different statutes that individualized decision-making appears preferable to a flat rule. If a rule were adopted, however, concerns about the
competence of courts as rulemakers suggest that a rule against severance and
similar narrowing practices would be wiser than a rule in favor.
CONCLUSION
Invalidating a statute is an imperious act by a court, with serious consequences. It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have tried to preserve
statutes that are only partly invalid by severing invalid provisions or applications, limiting their decisions to particular applications of the statute raised
by a case, or providing saving interpretations they would not otherwise
adopt. A rule-oriented view of law, however, suggests that these practices are
not as deferential as they appear, and may not always be desirable.
When a court avoids full invalidation of a statute by severance, as-applied
adjudication, or saving interpretation, the effect of its decision is to create
a new law, usually in the form of a new determinate rule. Once this is
understood, several conclusions follow. First, these three practices are similar in effect and should be judged by similar criteria. Second, courts should
not engage in these practices uncritically on grounds of “legislative supremacy.” Legislative supremacy is unhelpful because the alternative to judicial
invalidation of statutes is judicial rulemaking. Third, whether the new rule
that results from severance and related practices is a justified rule depends
on whether it yields net benefits, when judged by the principle or goal the
original statute was designed to promote. Unless the net benefits of the rule
are evident, the court should begin by considering comparative institutional competence to make this judgment, and if the legislature appears to
be better positioned for this purpose, should decline the rulemaking responsibility. In general, courts are poorly situated to issue comprehensive,
prospective rules; but their shortcomings as rulemakers will sometimes be
overcome by the delay and disruption that will follow if the rulemaking
function is returned to the legislature.
For these reasons, the current presumptions in favor of severability,
as-applied adjudication, and saving interpretation of statutes should be
dropped. This would mean that more legislation is completely undone by
judicial review. But it seems preferable to practices that obscure the full
consequences of judicial review by purporting to be modest when, in fact,
they result in new, judicially created rules. It also aligns the practice of
judicial review with the view that the Constitution is not a code of protected
conduct but a set of constraints on legal rules—a view I find persuasive.88
88. See Adler, supra note 5, at 153–58 (arguing that a “derivative account” of constitutional
rights, in which courts address the constitutionality of rules, indicates that courts must engage
in facial review of statutes).

